University of Nebraska at Omaha

DigitalCommons@UNO
Psychology Faculty Publications

Department of Psychology

2005

Distinctions among Terms Used to Describe
Emotions and Moods
Joseph A. Allen
University of Nebraska at Omaha, josephallen@unomaha.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/psychfacpub
Part of the Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Allen, Joseph A., "Distinctions among Terms Used to Describe Emotions and Moods" (2005). Psychology Faculty Publications. 81.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/psychfacpub/81

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department
of Psychology at DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.

Distinctions among Terms Used to Describe
Emotions and Moods
Joseph A. Allen
Brigham Young University

Emotion theorists continue to debate about differences between emotions and moods. Many agree that emotions are
necessarily directed at objects, whereas moods are not. This, and other, alternative differences between mood and
emotion terms were examined. Fifty undergraduate students were asked to rate a number of affect terms according
to their object-directedness, duration, intensity, physiological impact, and psychological feeling states. The results were
analyzed to illustrate possible differences between moods and emotions. Implications of the results are discussed.
Cornelius (1996) differentiates among four
schools of thought on the nature of emotion,
including the following: (1) Darwinian, (2)
Jamesian, (3) Cognitivist, and (4) Social
Constructionist. The first school of thought, the
Darwinian, suggests that emotion expression is a
function of serviceable habits that have evolved
with the organism. Serviceable habits themselves
were not associated with a given emotion per se
initially, but through time they become interconnected and rarely separated. William James’s
conception of emotion is similar to that of
Darwin’s, though he emphasized that emotions
are physiological and that, without the physiology
of emotion, there would be no emotion experience. The cognitivist approach to emotion
suggests that emotions necessarily involve a cognitive component, suggesting that emotions are
judgments or appraisals (Solomon, 2004). The
fourth perspective highlighted by Cornelius is the
social constructionist theory often credited to
James Averill (1975). This perspective states that
emotions are culturally and social constructed and
that the historical context of the individual
impacts the experience of a given emotion and
may even create the emotion experience.

Although these four perspectives have offered insight
into emotions, there is a marked absence of research
on the differentiation of emotions and moods.
Historically speaking, emotions and moods have
typically been differentiated by the stipulation that
emotions take objects and moods do not (Calhoun &
Solomon, 1984). Aristotle made the observation that
anger, which he deemed an emotion, is “necessarily
always directed towards someone in particular.” Thus,
the idea that emotions are objected-directed began
centuries ago and continues to be a criterion to this
day for distinguishing emotions from moods
(Cornelius, 1996; Ekman & Davidson, 1994;
Scherer, Wranik, Sangsue, Tran, & Scherer, 2004).
However, research is sparse as to possible distinctions
between terms used to describe emotions and moods
beyond object-directedness. Many researchers have
looked at the various aspects of emotions, such as
duration, intensity, psychological feeling, and various
physiological responses (Alvarado, 1998; Averill, 1975;
Niedenthal, Auxiette, Nugier, Dalle, Bonin, & Fayol,
2004). Measures of these features have successfully
differentiated among categories of affect (Innes-Ker &
Niedenthal, 2002). It was the goal of the present
study to further develop distinctions among the states
affect-related terms describe.
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Our first hypothesis was that terms used to describe
emotions and moods differ in that emotion terms
describe object-directed states, whereas mood terms do
not. Because many researchers agree that objectdirectedness is an attribute of emotions and not
moods, this stood as a litmus test for the emotion and
mood terms considered for this study (Frijda, 1994;
Bilimoria, 2004; Cornelius, 1996).
Our second hypothesis was derived from the first
and asserts that if the states referred to by emotion and
mood terms differ as to object-directedness, then they
may also differ in other respects. William James (1884)
and more recently Paul Ekman and Richard Davidson
(1994) would agree that biological contributions are
integral to emotion experience if not altogether the
entire nature of emotion. Also, Magda Arnold (1969)
would emphasize a cognitive component to emotion in
the form of judgments or appraisals. Thus, according
to Arnold, emotion experience, in contrast to mood
states, depends on the cognitive appraisal that initiates
a psychological feeling state associated with a particular
emotion.
Considering the difference derived from research
in object-directedness, and the subsequent theories
that illustrate other differences in emotion experience,
it was hypothesized that there would be differences
across ratings of emotion and mood terms on scales
related to physiological and psychological states. These
differences may indicate differences in how individuals
understand the terms used to describe mood states as
opposed to emotion states.

Subjects, Procedures, and Data Analysis
Preliminary to the final questionnaire with the
aforementioned scales, an initial list of terms used to
describe emotions and moods was compiled from previous research (Averill, 1975; Niedenthal et al., 2004;
Alvarado, 1998; Scherer et al., 2004). Averill’s (1975)
semantic atlas of emotion concepts was the starting
point with its 530 terms used to describe emotion
and/or mood states, and his terms were combined
with terms from other lists. After redundancies among
the terms were removed, 866 affect-related terms
remained. A group of five independent raters rated
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each of the 866 terms on a Likert type scale for
familiarity. They ranked each term on a scale from
one to nine where nine was “very familiar” and one
was “very unfamiliar.”
On the basis of the familiarity ratings, the top
100 terms were then rated for object-directedness
by four different independent raters (see Appendix
A). The object-directedness test was designed
to differentiate terms hypothesized to refer to
emotions and those referring to moods. Terms that
were unanimously rated as object-directed were categorized as emotions, terms unanimously rated as
not object-directed were categorized as moods, and
terms on which the raters were divided were
categorized as other or unknown.
From the 100 terms, the 20 most familiar
emotion terms, the 15 most familiar mood terms,
and the 15 most familiar other or unknown
terms are shown in Table 4. These 50 terms were
compiled into a questionnaire on which participants were to rate each term on scales of intensity,
duration, psychological feeling, and physiological
impact. Many of the scales were used in previous
research for the purpose of distinguishing between
different types of emotions as opposed to this
study’s focus on differences between moods and
emotions (Levenson, 1994; Averill, 1975;
Niedenthal et al., 2004). The final questionnaire
was administered to 50 undergraduate students in
classroom settings (see Appendix B for sample
questions).
The data was subsequently compiled and
analyzed. A multivariate analysis of variance was
conducted, along with univariate follow-up
analyses of the dependent variables to determine
significance. Term category (emotion, mood, or
other) served as the independent variable and
the 15 scales served as dependent variables. The
MANOVA indicated that the three categories of
terms did differ from one another across the linear
combination of the scales and the follow-up
univariate ANOVAs indicated that the term categories differed across each of the ratings scales. A
discriminant analysis was therefore conducted to
determine a pattern of differences among the term
categories across the rating scales.

Results and Discussion
Table 1 indicates that the three categories of
affect terms (emotion, mood, and other) were distinguishable on the basis of ratings on the dependent
variables (p < .001). The significance of these
findings allows for the possible delineation of similarities and differences for the three categories of
affect terms and substantiates the usefulness of the
selected scales.
Table 2 shows the means of the dependent
variables according to the term categories assigned.
It may be seen that emotions were rated higher on
intensity and the psychological feeling scales
(calm/violent, mild/turbulent, etc.), whereas
moods were rated higher on duration. Duration is
one measure often used to differentiate between
emotions and moods (Davidson, 1994; Frijda,
1994). Also, emotions were rated slightly higher
than moods on physiological impact, though the
ratings indicate the physiological contribution may
be small. The “other” category seems more sporadic and ultimately seems to overlap with emotion
and mood categories on various scales.
Table 3 shows the standardized discriminant
function scores for the dependent variables. The two
functions found through discriminant analysis
emphasize two of the major scale differentiators:
Function 1 emphasized psychological feeling and
Function 2 emphasized physiological impact. The
separation of the data into these two functions indicates that the scales that contribute to each function
discriminate the different terms among the three
categories. Thus, the scales differentiate to some
extent between the three hypothesized categories of
affect terms (emotions, moods, and others).
Figure 1 is a graph of the terms and category
means plotted in the space derived from the two
discriminant functions. The emotions seemed to
cluster together, thus indicating the scales’ ability
to identify emotions as having similarities. The
moods are less striking in their similarities according to the figure; however, twice as many mood
terms appear on the left quadrants of the graph
than do on the right quadrants. The “other” terms
were spread over the figure and therefore fit the

independent raters’ initial finding with the objectdirectedness survey that some of the terms may have
both emotion and mood characteristics. This implies
that when certain terms are used to describe affective
states, they may indicate experiences similar to that of
emotion and/or mood states.
Figure 2 was formulated to indicate groupings of
the terms from the ratings within the hypothesized
categories. As can be seen, certain moods fell in the
vicinity of the emotion grouping while some emotions
fell more closely to the grouping of moods. Also, the
“other” terms seemed to be separable into more
emotion-like and more mood-like categories. This may
indicate that certain moods behave more like emotions
according to the ratings and vice versa. This idea holds
for the group of “other” terms in that some were rated
more like emotions and some like moods.
Upon further analysis, terms from the “other”
category that were found in the emotion group seem to
carry a negative affective state whereas those rated like
the mood group seem to carry a positive affective state.
Perhaps the dimension that separated the other category into these two groups was the positive and negative
valence of the psychological feeling scales that seemed
to load on Function 1. Thus, the scales discriminated
terms in the “other” category into two groups not foreseen by the original hypotheses.

Conclusion and Implications
The first hypothesis suggested a standard
difference between emotions and moods, that of
object-directedness. If this assumption is correct and
the independent raters correctly categorized the terms
into object-directed and non-object-directed affective
states (emotions and moods), then perhaps the scales
chosen did not discriminate the emotions and moods
perfectly because they do not tap this distinction.
Object-directedness did separate the terms into
emotions and moods to some extent. However, perhaps
these scales illustrate the possibility that objectdirectedness is not a consistent difference between
emotions and moods and these scales do not consistently discriminate between affective terms that behave
as moods and those that behave as emotions either.
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The second and third hypotheses stated that, in
addition to the object-directedness hypothesis, the
terms may also differ according to other dimensions,
and other scales may distinguish terms used to describe
emotions and moods. The data substantiate these
claims, illustrating through discriminant analysis that
emotions and moods may differ in their levels of psychological feeling and physiological impact. This
implies that the terms used to describe certain affective
states mean different things and communicate different
meanings. Thus, a person who is experiencing a certain
level of physiological impact or psychological feeling
will use one term to describe his or her affective state.
The findings indicate that, as these levels of physiological impact or psychological feeling change, so will the
term used by an individual to describe the affective
state.
The findings of this study indicate that there is
consistency in the way that affect terms are used. Some
are used to refer to affective states with predominantly
psychological feeling characteristics (Function 1) while
other terms refer to states with physiological impact
characteristics (Function 2) or some combination of
the two. This implies a level of agreement among
English-speakers not only as to what a particular term
means, but in the characteristics of the experiences the
terms describe. Therefore, from these findings, it
may be seen that a possible function of affective
terms may be to assist individuals in making sense of
their affective states and those experienced by others.
Emotions and moods, though different, carry meaning
for the individuals who experience and observe them.
Terms describing these experiences, according to our
findings, allow individuals to label states that carry
with them cognitive and physiological components. It
would be problematic if a given language required a
dialogue of psychological feeling and physiological
impact for each affective state before individuals could
understand one another’s states. Thus the unique ability of humans to make sense of their environments is
aided by the terms used to describe emotions, moods,
and other affective states. Understanding what components of psychological feeling and physiological impact
are part of each affective term aids in that ability to
explain the human experience.
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Table 1: Univariate Analyses of Dependent
Variables
Dependent Variable
Intensity
Duration
Calm/Violent
Mild/Turbulent
Relaxed/Energized
Peace/Upset
Attraction/Aversion
Comfortable/Uncomfortable
Pleasure/Distress
Increased Heart Rate
Sweaty Palms
Rapid Breathing
Flushes
Chills
Trembling

F
11.02
30.06
54.10
64.29
31.98
165.40
161.47
160.92
179.12
46.67
31.84
25.62
28.47
9.92
31.84

Sig.
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

Table 2: Means of Dependent Variables for Each
Term Category
Dependent Variable
Emotion
Intensity
4.69
Duration
3.77
Calm/Violent
3.93
Mild/Turbulent
4.30
Relaxed/Energized
4.36
Peace/Upset
4.82
Attraction/Aversion
4.78
Comfortable/Uncomfortable 4.95
Pleasure/Distress
4.99
Increased Heart Rate
4.03
Sweaty Palms
3.00
Rapid Breathing
3.21
Flushes
2.68
Chills
1.96
Trembling
2.55

Mood
4.67
4.42
3.93
3.34
3.76
3.16
3.06
3.20
3.11
3.31
2.39
2.77
2.23
1.78
2.07

Other
4.33
3.92
3.33
3.55
3.70
3.65
3.68
3.77
3.74
3.13
2.36
2.54
2.04
1.65
1.90

Table 3: Standardized Discriminant Function
Scores for Each Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable
Function 1 Function 2
Intensity
0.06
0.29
Duration
-0.21
0.36
Calm/Violent
-0.12
-0.59
Mild/Turbulent
0.03
-0.10
Relaxed/Energized
-0.08
0.37
Peace/Upset
0.33
0.12
Attraction/Aversion
0.27
-0.25
Comfortable/Uncomfortable -0.03
-0.06
Pleasure/Distress
0.45
0.19
Increased Heart Rate
0.36
0.43
Sweaty Palms
0.02
-0.24
Rapid Breathing
-0.34
0.12
Flushes
0.07
0.29
Chills
-0.09
-0.07
Trembling
0.09
0.29
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Table 4: Hypothesized Categories of Emotions,
Moods, and Others from Object-Directedness
Survey
Emotions (20)
bored
mad
uncomfortable
sad
hate
happy
anxious
angry
nervous
confused
depressed
scared
embarrassed
confident
afraid
disappointed
ashamed
love
bitter
fear

Moods (15)
grief
determination
cheerful
caring
erotic
lonely
romantic
sensitive
pain
aggressive
shy
compassionate
carefree
excitement
comfortable

Other (15)
enthusiastic
pride
desperate
appreciative
guilty
careful
doubt
impatient
calm
passionate
relaxed
respect
insecure
mean
pessimistic

Figure 1: Scatter Diagram of Discriminant
Means for Terms on Functions 1 and 2.
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Figure 2: Scatter Diagram with Categorical
Overlap Illustrated

Appendix A
Object directedness survey instructions
Instructions: On the following pages there is a list
of affect terms. To determine if these terms take an
object, insert them into a sentence under the format,
subject-verb-object or SVO. For example, “I am ____
that ____” where the first blank is the affect term and
the second blank is an object (i.e., “I am concerned
that you are sick”). Another example would be
“I ________” where the first blank is the term and the
second blank is an object (i.e., “I eat pizza”). These are
two simple examples used to illustrate object directedness of some affect terms, but are not the limit to
appropriate sentences under the SVO structure. If the
term fits grammatically into a sentence with
the subject-verb-object format, then put an “X” in the
blank next to the term. (Walk through five examples
before beginning task.)

Appendix B

4. How frequently are experiences of (term) associated with the
following descriptions? (record the frequency from the scale
below each description on the answer sheet)

Sample scales/questions from survey
1. Please indicate how intense experiences of (term) typically are by recording on the answer sheet the appropriate
response from the scale below.

Almost
Never
Always
1

Never

5

6

7

a. Increased Heart Rate:
1
2
3

4

5

6

7

2. Experiences of (term) typically last? (please indicate
duration of experiences on the scale below)

b. Sweaty Palms:
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

Seconds minutes half hour hour several hours days
weeks
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

c. Rapid Breathing:
1
2
3

4

5

6

7

d. Flushes (face turning red):
1
2
3
4

5

6

7

e. Chills:
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

f. Trembling:
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

3

4

5

6
7
High intensity

3. Experiences of (term) may best be described with which
of the following terms? (the closer the number is to the
descriptive word, the greater the degree of association with
the term)
a.
1

Calm
2

Violent
3

4

5

6

7

b.
1

Mild
2

3

4

5

6

Turbu lent
7
Energized

c. Relaxed
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

d. Peace
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

e. Attraction
1
2

Upset

Aversion
3

4

5

6

f. Comfortable
1
2
3

4

5

6

g. Pleasure
1
2

3

Undecided
4

1
2
Low intensity

2

Rarely

Almost
Occasionally Always

7
Uncomfortable
7
Distress

3

4

5

6

7
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